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3
Christopher Sherrin LLM, PhD
Professor, Department of Professional Legal Education
The University of Hong Kong
The somewhat portentous title to this article is designed to provoke a
critical examination of the core provisions of the Ordinance. It is not
possible in the time available to comprehensively review the provisions
of the Ordinance but rather the scope will be to concentrate on the
first five sections which embody the core elements of the discretionary
jurisdiction.' I shall also consider the only three reported cases in Hong
Kong on the Ordinance, focusing particularly on In the Estate of Lee Sai
Wai,2 a 2002 decision at first instance and in the Court of Appeal.
Introduction
berNovem-The Ordinance was enacted in 1995 and came into force on 31995. As such it was part ot a series of reforming and amending
Ordinances of the same date, to the law of succession, including the
Wills (Amendment) Ordinance and the Intestate Estates' (Amendment)
,Ordi-Ordinance. Whereas the other 1995 Ordinances were Amendingnances to their namesakes, the IPFDO was a wholly new provision that
Thus time does not allow me to fllly discuss the important pr,visions in ss 10 to 15 relating; to
anti-avoidance and evasion provisions. Nor the ancillary powers of interim awards, variation,
effect of divorce, etc.
120011 4 HKC 559;120021 4 HKC 517 (with further unreported proceedings in the case, MP
4859/2001) first instance; affirmed by the Court of Appeal CACV 301/2002, the only really
substantive decision on the Ordinance and which will be fllly discussed.
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completely replaced the previous Deceased's Family Maintenance
Ordinance (Cap 129).
The long title of the Inheritance (Provision for Family and
Dependants) Ordinance (Cap 481, hereafter shortly referred to as the
Ordinance),
poweringem-
proclaims it to be an ordinance to make provision for
the court to make orders for the making out of the estate of a
deceased person of provision for certain members of that person's family
and dependants of that person, and for connected matters. The seminal
legislation on family provision was the English Inheritance (Family
Provision) Act 1938. The provisions of the 1938 Act (as amended) was
copied into Hong Kong law by the Deceased's Family Maintenance
Ordinance, Cap 129, which was enacted in 1971 contemporaneously
with the Wills Ordinance (1970), the Intestates' Estates Ordinance and
the Probate and Administration Ordinance (both 1971).
The original Deceased's Family Maintenance Ordinance, like the
English 1938 Act on which it was based, was a fairly timid intrusion into
testamentary
tivelyrela-
freedom; it was limited in scope and was found to be
ineffective. The deficiencies of the original legislation can be
easily identified.4 The class of potential applicants with locus standi to
apply for provision out of the deceased estate was very limited. The powers
of the court were limited to making an award for the maintenance only
of the applicant. The court could only make an award out of the deceased's
net estate on death; there were no powers to augment that estate to
sequencecon-facilitate an award and there were no anti-avoidance provisions.
In
of these three main deficiencies, both the English 1938 Act
and the Hong Kong 1971 Ordinance, were largely ineffective to achieve
their objectives of preventing abuse of the freedom of testation and to
correct unfairness in the law of intestacy; the jurisdictions were rarely
invoked and had little impact on the law of succession. The deficiencies
in the law of family provision had been highlighted in England by the
Law Commission,5 who recommended fundamental and far-reaching
changes to the law. These resulted in the wholly new English Inheritance
See
sionSucces-
the Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong; Report on the Law of Wills, Intestate
and Provision for Deceased Persons' Families and Dependants.
4 Para 13.4.
s Second Report on Family Property: Family Provision
on Death (Law Corn no 61).
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(Provision for Family and Dependants) Act of 1975.When the Hong
Kong Law Reform Commission undertook a similar enquiry in 1989
they had little hesitation in recommending that a new Ordinance he
enacted similar in scope and content to the English Act of 1975. Thus
the Hong Kong Ordinance derives very largely from the analogous
English 1975 Act of the same name and the Ordinance closely follows
the contents and provisions of that Act.'
The relationship between the 1971 Ordinance and the 1995 Ordinance
'The reported case of Ye Hong Ying v Chan Lup Ying (No 1) considered
some interesting points on the relationship between and the transition
from the earlier to the later Ordinance. The issues arose because
although the deceased died in January 1993, before the coming into
effect of the new Ordinance, the action was filed by originating sum-
mons on 17 November 1995 after the new Ordinance had come into
effect. The deceased's will left the entirety of his estate to his second
dant''depen-wife, the defendant, and his first wife, the plaintiff, claimed (as aas defined in the Ordinance) against the estate for reasonable
provision for her maintenance under section 4(1) of the Deceased's
Family Maintenance Ordinance (Cap 129). The action was commenced
by originating summons and the defendant argued that the originating
summons should be struck out on substantive and procedural grounds.
First, it was argued that the court had no jurisdiction in view of the
!repeal of the Deceased's Family Maintenance Ordinance on 3 Novem-
ber 1995 when it was replaced by the new Ordinance. The court dismissed
this argument holding that since the deceased died before 3 November
1995, the repeal did not affect an order made under it even if made after
that date, this being preserved by the transitional provisions in section
33(1) of the Ordinance. Secondly, it was argued that the summons could
Report on the Law of Wills, Intestate Succession and Provision tor Deceased Persons Fandies
and Dependants. See n 3 above.
: Both of these Law Commission Reports are fruitful sources of explanation and comment on
the legislation to which reference can usefilly be made.
'
Although there significant differences in the of the Act and the Ordinance,are some terms
sionsprovi-many
of the authorities on the Act can usefully be referred to under the corresponding
of the Ordinance and several such cases are referred to in this lecture - whilst recognising
of course that the English cases have no direct authority on the Hong Kong law.
:') [1996]3 HKC 426.
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not
inghav-
be filed before probate had been taken out; this was rejected as
no basis under the provisions of the (old) Ordinance particularly
in the light of section 11(1) of the (old) Ordinance which enabled the
court to make an interim maintenance order. Further, the six-month
time limit (section 6) * from the date when representation was first
taken out * did not preclude earlier applications before representation
was taken out. Although it would certainly be unusual to commence a
family provision action before a grant of representation has been taken
out there is no reason in general procedural rules why this should not
be done.
mencecom-
The procedural grounds centered on whether it was correct to
the claim by summons rather than by writ; the court holding
ceedingspro-
that the procedure by summons was not inappropriate because the
were not based on an allegation of fraud and the hearing of the
summons would provide sufficient opportunity for any inconsistencies
to be taken into account.
The case revisited the court as Ye Hong Ying v Chan Lup Ying (No 2) .'o
deredor-
In the first action the court had decided in the plaintiff's favour and
the defendant to pay a monthly payment ofHK$6,000 to the plaintiff,
under the Deceased's Family Maintenance Ordinance. This was varied by
an order to pay a lump sum of HK$1.2m, under section 8 of the new
Ordinance, it being held that where the deceased died before the new
Ordinance came into effect, an application could be made under the new
Ordinance to vary the order made under the old Ordinance.Il The figure
was calculated as one third of the current value of the estate. It was thought
that, although the starting point for calculating the amount of the award
was the value of the net estate at the death, adjustments should be made
on an application for variation to reflect the current value of the estate.
Justice Cheung took the opportunity to point out the differing
objectives of the two Ordinances. Under the earlier Ordinance. '... the
aim was to ensure the widow can have a reasonable living while under
ablereason-the later Ordinance, the aim is to ensure the widow can have
a
share in the estate.'
1 1199912 HKC 786.
11
Applying Kung Lok Ping v Ngai Fook Sang and Another (HCMP) 158/95, unrep.
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Characteristics of the Legislation
Judicial Discretion
The legislation provides a remedial jurisdiction to reflect principles of
fairness and equity in the inheritance of deceased estates by providing a
discretionary jurisdiction which can be invoked to correct manifest
unfairness and injustice in cases where the deceased has by his will, or
by the effects of intestacy, failed to provide properly for his spouse,
children, relatives or dependants.
The law of family provision as set out in the Ordinance is based on
the common law system of a judicial discretionary system of provision;
there is no notion of 'fixed rights of inheritance' as characterise the civil
law inheritance systems. It follows that all claims for family provision
under the common law must be by way of application to the court and
the invocation of a judicial discretion in the applicant's favour.
The advantages of this are apparent; the provision made, if any, can
textcon-
be specifically tailored to the applicant's needs and deserts in the
of the claims of the other persons with entitlement to the deceased
bounty.
nessprecise-
Thus it embodies flexibility, fairness, appropriateness,
and judgment. The fixed and automatic rights of inheritance under
the civil system have corresponding and contrasting disadvantages.
However the disadvantages of the common law judicial discretionary
system are obviously those inherent in any system that requires an
application to the court; delay, expense, complexity, uncertainty and
*
necessary recourse to lawyers - all of which the civil system avoids.
The jurisdiction is characterised as requiring application to the court
to invoke the exercise of a judicial discretion. As such the jurisdiction
suffers from the defects of being potentially expensive in legal costs;
uncertain in outcome and conducive of delay in resolution. it is no
doubt these factors which have deterred many applications under the
Ordinance in Hong Kong * although the corresponding legislation in
England has been more frequently invoked resulting in many reported
,cases on the jurisdiction.
Since the law of family provision is dependent on the exercise of
multi-layered judicial discretion the outcome of an application2 is
unpredictable and uncertain and this uncertainty is correspondingly
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multi-layered and permeates the whole process of the jurisdiction. The
establishment of locus standi is uncertain; proof of the failure to make
reasonable financial provision is not clear cut; persuading the court to
exercise its discretion depends on complex relative factors and what sort
of order the applicant may obtain is unpredictable.
Impact of the Ordinance
It is clear that successful invocations of the jurisdiction to make family
provision orders in Hong Kong are rare; successful applications under
the Ordinance are very much the exception rather than the rule. Indeed,
such statistical evidence as is available, suggests that the jurisdiction
is very rarely litigated. Yam J in Chambers in Re Estate of Lee Sai WaiLL
stated that: There are no reported decisions of the courts in Hong Kong
on proceedings under the IPFDO, and accordingly no guidance as to
where the incidence of costs orders should fall.
My research has revealed only three reported family provision cases
in Hong Kong:
1. Ye Hong Ying v Chan Lup Ying (No 1) (1966);14 (No 2) (1999),1s
which has already been considered;
2. Re Estate of Lee Sai Wai (deceased), Leung Kam Yin, Joyce v Li Oi
Lun (2001 and 2002),' the only really substantive decision on
the ordinance and which will be fully discussed;
3.
allyperipher-
Wang Din Shin v Nina Kung (2003 ),' which is only very
relevant to the ordinance and need not be further discussed.
12 HCMP4859/2001, unrep.
11 The judge decided that the costs should come from the estate and not from the award, see
below.
14 119961 3 HKC 426.
15 119991 2 HKC 786.
i6 [2001] 4 HKC 559;1200214 HKC 517 (with further unreported proceedings in the case, MP
4859/2001) first instance; affirmed by the Court of Appeal CACV 301/2002.
17 120031 463 HKCU 1.
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Retrospective and Prospective
It is apparent from the paucity of these reported and unreported cases,
that recourse to the Ordinance in the form of applications for family
provision is rare. However quite apart from substantive applications
it is suggested that the Ordinance does play a significant (though
unquantifiable) latent role in Hong Kong probate law in two ways. The
main rationale of- the legislation is to provide *aa post-death remedial
action which can challenge, upset and rewrite the terms of a will or the
distribution under intestacy; a retrospective corrective impact. But the
jurisdiction also has a prospective negative impact acting prospectively
as a deterrent to testators who are minded to disregard the legal or moral
claims of their families or dependants; a prospective deterrent impact. It
is not possible to quantify the importance or impact of this deterrent
effect but anecdotal evidence with respect to the reciprocal legislation
ingtak-in England, suggests that it is of some significance. Thus solicitorsinstructions from their clients to draft wills which they feel might
attract challenge after the death, should be alive to the necessity of
advising clients of the jurisdiction 'and the possible effect of a successful
claim against the estate. Where a testator is adamant that he has good
reasons for excluding a family member or dependant (who might be
considered to have a possible post-death claim) then it may be desirable
to include a statement of these reasons in the will. Such a statement is
certainly
tivesubjec-
not binding on the court since the test is objective not
but the court can have regard to reasons under the general phrase
'any other matter' in section 5( 1)(g).'8 Other than that there is little
that a testator can do to preempt a possible challenge to his will after his
death; he certainly cannot seek to exclude the statunry jurisdiction.
Settlement
There is the important issue of settlement. There is empirical evidence
in England that the legislation is often invoked as a bargaining tactic
against an estate leading to settlement of the claim in order to avoid
cost and delay in the administration of the estate. Certainly it is the
experience in England that most family provision claims are settled by
t See the cases in n 29 bel.w. Such 'reasons' can he admissible under the Evidence Ordinance; see
the Evidence (Amendment) Ordinance No 2 of 1999, s 6 that repealed s 23 o! the 1995 Ordinance.
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the applicant and the beneficiaries without recourse to a formal judicial
hearing. Indeed such is the threat in terms of delay and expense in
the administration of the estate by a family provision claim that the
beneficiaries and the executors are often persuaded to settle 'buy*
off' might be a more accurate description in some cases marginally
*
meritorious claims in order to remove them so that the distribution of
the estate can proceed.
Thus Cheung J's peroration in Ye Hong Ying v Chan Lup Ying (No 2)
was as follows: 'It is my wish that the two families
should make peace
and treat this proceeding as the last litigation between them. Apart
from
further reducing the value of the estate, I can see no legitimate reason
for having a contested probate action. In view of the order I have made,
I would strongly urge the parties to reach an overall settlement
so that
probate can be obtained as soon as possible ...
A Forgotten or Ignored Jurisdiction?
Whatever the extent of these negative impacts it is clear that there
are
very
nanceOrdi-
few positive invocations of the jurisdiction by positive application
and it is interesting to examine why the jurisdiction under the
is so little used in Hong Kong. It is suggested that the
reason is
not so much that the Ordinance is unknown
or forgotten but that it is
ignored as being too fraught with uncertainty and unpredictability
to
warrant the time and expense of application resulting
in civil proceedings.
An analysis of the provisions of the Ordinance
will illustrate this point
under three perspectives.
A dichotomy of objectives
A fundamental ambiguity inherent in the
Ordinance is that it is not
a unitary jurisdiction with a single objective;
it is a dichotomy of
1 9 [19991 2 HKC 786.
20 Likewise Yam J in the Chambers hearing
in Re Estate of Lee Sai Wai, HCMP4859/2001:
'I was
concerned to learn during the argument on these matters
that probate in the estate has not yet
been granted, although it is
now more than 2 years since the deceased's death
...... 1 would .
view with great concern any further delay
in the administration of the estate.'
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jurisdictions
ingcontrast-
with each part resting on entirely separate and
bjectives. There are in truth two distinct classes of applicant who
bandshus-are dealt with in entirely separate ways; these are applications byand wives on the one hand; and all other eligible categories of
cialcru-applicants on the other. This arises because of the meaning of thephrase 'reasonable financial provision' which is fundamentally
different to each category.
The surviving spouse standard
In the case of the former, it means such financial provision as it would
be reasonable in all the circumstances of the case for such a person to
nancemainte-receive whether or not that provision is required for his or her(s ction 3(2)(a)). But in the case of all other applicants it means
stancescircum-such financial provision as it would be reasonable in all theof the case for the applicant to receive for his maintenance
(section 3(2)(b)).
In Ye Hong Yingv Chan Lup Ying (No 2)-'1 Cheung J stated that under
the IPFDO, the aim is to ensure the widow can have a reasonable share
of the estate. This was contrasted with the position under the previous
.DFMO where the aim was to ensure the widow could have a reasonable
Eliving. Thus so far as husbands and wives are concerned the jurisdiction
is designed to achieve a fair division of the communal assets, in which
[notions of community of property, or the divorce criteria of one half of
[the joint assets, can come into play. A widow is not simply limited to a
,claim for maintenance but is entitled to a fair share in capital terms, of
[the estate. Accordingly applications by disinherited, or inadequately
fprovided, husbands and wives are far more likely to succeed and to result
petingcom-
in much greater provision, regardless of the strength of the relative
claims.
21
119961 3 HKC 426. This approach is consistent with and reflective or, the modem attitude to
divorce settlements where the objective is not so much to ensure that the husband provides
maintenance, as to provide Mr a fair division of the joint assets with a basic 50/50 criteria; sec
White v White 120001 3 WLR 1571 and Cowan v Cowan 120011 1 All ER (D) 173; English
authorities which do not necessarily apply inm Hong Kong.
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The best illustration of the surviving spouse standard is provided byRe Besterman (deed):2 where the English Court of Appeal decided that
in the case of a very large estate where the testator's only obligation was
to his widow who was wholly blameless and incapable of supporting
herself, reasonable provision required that she should have access to a
sufficient lump sum to ensure beyond any reasonable doubt that she was
relieved of any (financial) anxiety for the future.
The maintenance standard
In the case of all other applicants (except tsip or male partner) all that
cernedcon-
the applicant is entitled to is maintenance, and the jurisdiction is
only with discharging a maintenance obligation on the part of
the deceased. The necessity to prove a maintenance obligation explains
why it is difficult for an able bodied adult child to make a successful
application for financial provision.3
It is thought that the general approach to 'maintenance' under the
Ordinance will be the same as in other jurisdictions, such as provision
for a wite or child on separation. As to the meaning of maintenance in
family provision cases reference can be made to Lord Browne-Wilkinson
in Re Dennis::4 maintenance connotes only payments which, directly
or indirectly, enable the applicant in the future to discharge the cost of
his daily living at whatever standard ot living is appropriate to him.
A further judicial statement is that ofGoffJ in Re Coventm:5 What
is proper maintenance must in all cases depend upon all the facts and
circumstances ot the particular case being considered at the time, but
I think it is clear on the one hand that one must not put too limited a
meaning on it; it dos not mean just enough to enable a person to get by;
on the other hand it does not mean anything which may be regarded as
reasonably desirable for his general benefit or welfare.26
,2 119841 2 All ER 656.
23 See Re Coventry I1980] Ch 46l and Re Jennings 119941 Ch 286
24 11981]2 Ail ER 140.
25 119801 Ch 461 at p 485, adopting a strict view inm relation to an adult son. See also ReJenni
119941 Ch 286, where it was not thought that the discharge of the applicant's mortgage col
properly be regarded as maintenance.
2o Cited by Blackburne J in Robinson v Bird 120031 All ER (D} 190.
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Thus in England applications by adult children will rarely succeed,
since they will find it difficult to establish a maintenance obligation on
the deceased and even if they can do so, the obligation can be discharged
by a modest order simply providing maintenance for so long as that
obligation prevails.:r More successful have been claims by cohabitants
or unmarried de fact() spouses where the claim has been essentially for
the continuance of the provision of accommodation owned by the
deceased; in such cases the maintenance requirement can be met by an
order that the applicant should have a right to continue to occupy the
premises without any transfer of ownership or proprietary rights to the
premises.2s
The different standards
This dichotomy of meaning provides for and differentiates between the
surviving spouse standard and the maintenance standard which is
relevant to both the questions first, whether the will or intestacy makes
reasonable financial provision for the applicant and secondly, if not,
what order the court should make in order to make that provision. The
surviving spouse standard is much more generous recognising that a
husband or wife is entitled to a significant share of the estate assets over
and above that which is strictly required for his or her maintenance.
. Application of the jurisdiction
nanceOrdi-A further confusion of objectives arises in the application of theto both testate and intestate (total and partial) estates.
Testate estates
In the case of testate estates the jurisdiction is designed to serve as a
fetter to unbridled testamentary freedom and to provide a remedy inm
See Re Coventry, above; Re Jennings, above; William. lohns 11988[ 2 FLR 475, wherev a restr c-
tive attitude is apparent. But contrast the following cases where applications by adult children
succeeded, mostly because of some exceptionally compellinz circumstances: Re Dehenham
(1986) 7 FLR 404; Re Abrams [1996l 2 FLR 379; Re Pearce [19981 2 FLR 705; Re Ham,ck
[1998] 2 FLR 346; Espinosa v Bourke 119991 1 FLR 747 and Re Goodchild 11997] 1 WLR 1216.
:* :'
elley fliffe 119811 Fam 128 and Bishop Plumley 119911 1 WLR 582.v v
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cases of intentional (or unintentional) unfairness or eccentricity in the
testamentary dispositions. Wills are by definition subjective expressions
of the testator's wishes but in making awards against a testate estate the
court views the matter
objectively not subjectively, ie the judgecisesexer-his discretion to achieve a distribution of the estate which he thinks
is objectively right or fair, whatever the views, whether expressed in the
will
ilyfam-
or not, of the testator may be. It can of course happen that a
provision award can effectuate the frustrated intentions of the testator;
where the testator makes a will which fails because of a defect of
formalities, the court can simply effectuate those failed intentions by
reproducing them in the order. But most successful family provision claims
result in a rectification by change in the testator's dispositions, not a
confirmation of them. Further this objective evaluation is determined
in the light of the circumstances which exist at the date of the hearing -
not at the date of the death (section 5(7)) so that changes in the situa-
tion of the applicant or of the testamentary beneficiaries whether
financial or personal, will be taken into account.
Intestate estates
The impact of family provision on intestacy is entirely different. The
rules of distribution on intestacy are supposedly based on objective
notions of fairness and reason as applied to the average or median estate
mentalsupple-and so the intervention of family provision serves to correct in away the operation of those rules to exceptional estates. It can .
certainly be argued that family provision provides a much needed l
element of flexibility to what is an otherwise fixed and rigid system
of entitlement in order to cope with the exceptional rather than the:
average circumstances.
An obvious example is the ability to use the jurisdiction to make:
provision for a de facto (common law) husband and wife who is not th
legally married spouse of the deceased and, in the days when illegitimate:
29 Re Coventry I19801 Ch 461; Williams v .lohns 1198812 FLR 475 where the testator's expressec:..
reasons were not followed. Likewise in Re Estate of Lee Sai Wai 120021 4 HKC 517, where the
implicit wish of the testator that his estate should pass to his family rather than to his widow.
was not thought to be compelling; see discussed below.
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children had no entitlement on intestacy, for the offspring of such a
relationship. The law of intestacy, for reasons more of policy than logic,
declines to sanction provision for the de facto spouse (and previously for
the illegitimate off spring of such a relationship) by a fixed statutory
right to inheritance, preferring to provide a remedy where one is needed
by
testacyin-
the lateral route of family provision. In the same way the law of
makes no provision for a step-child ie the child of the deceased's
partner to a marriage which is not the deceased's child, but such a child
may be able to apply as a 'child of the family', under the Ordinance.
e
So it can be said that in testate situations family provision operates
on the will or intentions of the deceased, whereas in intestate situations
it operates on the defects of the intestacy statute. But if one pursues the
supplementary remedial role of family provision on the law of intestacy
a major incongruity is apparent; family provision in the case of every
one
testacyin-
except spouses is only concerned with maintenance whereas
is concerned with distribution of the estate. Thus if intestacy
fails to recognise the common law spouse as entitled to any share of the
estate, the best that family provision can do is to make an order for his
or her maintenance which is a poor substitute.
Similarly if it is thought that a poorer devoted sister who cared for
her richer sibling for many years at considerable disadvantage to herself,
is more worthy of inheritance than neglectful nephews and nieces of
a deceased sibling, the court has no power under family provision to
correct the injustice by giving the whole intestate estate to her. If her
one half (or less) of the estate is insufficient for her maintenance the
court may be able to supplement that out of the other share(s) but is
unlikely to be able to direct the whole capital value to her. It is perhaps
o See s 3(1)(vii). An illustrative English case is Re Leach I1986] Ch 226 where an adultdaughterstep-brought a successful action against her step-mother's estate, because the step-mother's
estate consisted largely of the property of the applicant's lather. It was decided that in order to
be treated as a child of the marriage it is not necessary that the child should he a minor; an
adult child can be so treated. See also Re Callaghan 119851 Fam t.
rated(acili-
In England applications by cohabitants (common-law de facto spouses) have beenor
by the introduction of a new and distinct category of locus standi for such persons: the
Law Reform (Succession) Act s 2, but this legislation has no counterpart in Hong Kong. The
first reported case in England on applications by cohal7itants under the new para ( ha) is
Re Watson 119991 1 FLR 878
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because of these inconsistencies of objective that the seminal FamilyProvision legislation, the English 1938 Act, did not apply to intestacy;that Act was only extended to apply to intestate estates in 1966.
The augmentation of the estate and anti-evasion provisions
An important feature of the Ordinance is provisions designed to make the
jurisdiction effective and to curb attempts at evasion and avoidance. Such
provisions are essential because orders made under the Ordinance can
actcounter-
only be made against the deceased's net estate and so, in order to
attempts at rendering applications ineffective by minimising the net
sionsprovi-
estate on death, complicated and difficult to apply anti-avoidance
a e included. These are aimed at counteracting attempts by the
deceased to manipulate the assets during his lifetime for the benefit of the
preferred beneficiary but they can be regarded as artificial and arbitrary in
effect,
terrentde-
expensive in litigation costs to invoke and thus constituting a
to proceedings. These provisions fall into two main categories.
ingmean-
First, there are provisions that augment, in an artificial way, the
of 'net estate' for the purposes of the Ordinance. The property of the
deceased
itedlim-
out of which the judge has power to make an order is not
to the usual concept of the 'net estate'. In certain situations the net
estate can be augmented to include property not usually included in the
estate available, for instance, for the payment of debts.32
Thus property subject to a donatio mortis causa or to a nomination
can he included as part of the net estate for this purpose. Further, and
more significantly, is the provision dealing with joint tenancies.33 An
obvious way of minimising the net estate at death would be to put the
property into the joint names of the owner and the beneficiary inter
vivos; on death the joint interest is an interest ceasing on death, does
not, per se, form part of the deceased's estate, and passes by survivorship
tratefrus-to the surviving beneficiary. The Ordinance contains provisions tosuch intentions where property has been deliberately put into joint
names in order to minimise the size of the estate on death, by providing
a mechanism whereby for the purposes of the Ordinance, joint property
32 Section 10.
33 Section II.
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can be deemed to be part of the estate. This provision
'4
states that if an
application for financial provision is made under the Ordinance within
six months of the date on which representation with respect to the
estate of the deceased was first taken out, the court fi)r the purpose of
facilitating the making ot financial provision for the applicant, may
order that the deceased's severable share of that property, at the value
thereof immediately before his death, shall to such extent as appears
to the court to be just in all the circumstances of the case, be treated for
the purposes of the Ordinance as part of the net estate of the deceased.
However, laudable though the intent might be, the provision is riven
with unanswered practical problems. Any such order will be made many
months after the death and thus many months after the survivorship has
*
taken place. The property may or may not be still in the hands of the
survivor and, may or may not be in the same form. If the property has
been spent (the provision applies to joint Bank Accounts) the order
will be nugatory and similarly if the property has been disposed of to a
third party it seems doubtful if any order could affect such third party,
retrospectively affecting title. There are no express tracing provisions in
the sections.
Secondly, there are the 'claw-back' provisions which enable inter
'vivos transaction to be rendered, in effect, voidable or nullified. The
itwo manifestations of these are in section 12 whereby property which
ihas been given away inter vivos can be made subject to an order which
,effectively claws back the property into the estate. Thus inter vivos
gifts can be made subject to orders requiring the donated property to be
,ciaryhenefi-[paid back into the estate thus defeating attempts to benefit theby substantial inter vivos gifts with the intention of frustrating
*possible applications under the Ordinance by seeking to reduce the value
of the estate on death.35 It must be noted that such an order can only be
made against the donee of the property (whether or not at the date of
the order he holds any interest in the property disposed of to him or for
his benefit) and so cannot affect any third party to whom the property
'34 Section 11(1).
'35 Sections 12-15.
96 Section 12.
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has been transferred. 7 And in section 13 whereby inter vivos contracts
to take effect on death can be nullified.3s
But it is a brave litigant who embarks on an invocation of these
provisions!
A Multi-Layered Discretion
The operation of the Ordinance is based on the exercise of a judicial
discretion which is multi-layered and complex because it not only
involves several stages of decision and choice, but also because it
requires the court, at each stage, to consider not only the merits of the
applicant's case but also to balance the merits of other relative and
competing claims against the estate.
The first layer: locus standi to apply
The first stage ofany application requires the proof of locus standi, which
is not straightforward since it involves, in most cases, the first layer
of judicial decision. All applicants must establish that they are either
domiciled in Hong Kong, or resident in Hong Kong for the three years
immediately preceding death.'' Then the applicant must prove that he
or she falls within one of the nine separate categories of persons with
37 Section 12(1). There are complex ndes in subsequent subsections providing for the identifica
non of the property or the amount of money which could be the subject of an order against the
donee where the property has been disposed of or transferred. But these rules seem fraught
with difficulties in their practical application.
3s Section 13 on contracts to leave property by will; see Schaefer v Schuhmann 119721 AC 572.
If
the contract is unexecuted the order will direct the personal representatives not to execute it;
if the contract has been executed the order to provide money can only be made against the
donee (the person with whom or for the benefit of whom the contract was made) and so
cannot affect a third party.
39 Section 3(1). Domicile is a difficult, though established concept of private international law.
The alternative Residence is a novel provision inm this area of law which has no counterpart
in
the English legislation. The phrase is redolent of uncertainty since the meaning of 'ordinarily
resident' is not a clearly defined term of art. Further it will be noted that the paragraph does
not state that the residence must be 'in or during the 3 years prior to death'
but refers to such
residence 'at any time in the 3 years immediately preceding his death' which,
it is suggested
opens the door to argument and dispute. It is submitted
that the jurisdiction should be based
solely on domicile and that paragraph (b) would have been better omitted.
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locus standi to apply. Only two of these categories are defined in factual
terms which do not involve any element of judicial decision or judgment,
namely, the wife or husband of the deceased (para (i)) and a tsip or male
partner of the deceased by a union of concubinage (para (iii)).
tionevalua-The category of an infant child is qualified by requiring thethat the child 'is, by reason of some mental or physical disability,
incapable of maintaining himself' (para (v)).
The category of a 'child of the family' by the evaluation that the
child 'was treated by the deceased as a child of the family in relation to
[the deceased's] marriage' (para (vii)).
bandhus-All the other specific categories of applicant; a former wife orof the deceased (para (ii)); a parent of the deceased (para (iv)); an
adult child of the deceased (para (vi)); 'a child of the family' (para (vii));
and a brother or sister of the deceased (para (viii)) requires proof that
such person 'was being maintained, either wholly or substantially, by
the deceased'.
The last residual category is wholly evaluative: 'any person ...who
immediately before the death of the deceased was being maintained,
either
minationdeter-
wholly or substantially, by the deceased' (para (ix)). The
of this requirement in relation to paragraphs (ii), (iv), (v),
(vii), (vii) and (ix) is governed by the following guideline: 'a person
shall be treated as being maintained by the deceased, either wholly or
substantially, as the case may be, if the deceased, otherwise than for full
valuable consideration, was making a substantial contribution in money
. or money's worth towards the reasonable needs of that person'.
It will be apparent that this provision is redolent of uncertainty: what
amounts to
'substantially'; 'full valuable consideration'; 'money's worth'
and 'reasonable needs'? 40 It can be noted that it is essential that a person
.4)
Notwithstanding the difficulties there have been a number of reported successful applications
in England under the corresponding paragraph (e); these include: Re Wilkinson 119781 Fam 22
(sister); Malone v Harrison 119791 1 WLR 1353 (mistress); (le'* t, Iliffe 119811 Fain 128:
Re Beaumont 119801 Ch 444; Harrington v Gill (1983) 4 FLR 265 (common law spouse); Bishop
v Plumles 119911 1 WLR 582 (common law wife); Rces v Neuberry 11998] 1 FLR 1041 (friend).
Unsuccessful applications include Kourke'* v Lusher (1982) 12 Fain Law 86 (mistress) and
Layton v Martin [19861 2 FLR 227 (same). A most interesting and unlsual cae was Rc B.
Bouette v Rose [20001 Ch 662 where a mother successfully claimed against the estate of her
calmedi-deceased minor daughter; the daughter had been born disabled due wholly or partly tonegligence at her birth, and had been awarded considerable compensation in damages as a
result; the mother used this money to support both her and her daughters expenses ot Ii','ing.
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claiming locus standi should have survived the deceased. Claims by the
personal representatives of predeceased persons will not be entertained.
Further it has been decided in England that not only must the applicant
be alive at the death but must remain alive up to the date of judgment
making the award. So that if an applicant, although surviving the
deceased dies before the hearing of the case, the application cannot be
continued for the benefit of his estate.4'
The second laver: the testamentarv or intestate provision
Once the applicant has established locus standi the court then has to
determine whether 'the disposition of the deceased's estate effected by
his will or the law relating to intestacy, or the combination of his will
and that law, is not such as to make reasonable financial provision for
the applicant' (section 3(1)). The determination of this question is wholly
evaluative being dependent on the meaning of the phrase' reasonable
financial provision' which has been fully discussed below, and is to be
determined by a number ofstated factors, both general and specific, which
are set out in section 5.
The third laver: whether to make an order for reasonable financial provision
When the applicant has satisfied the court on the first two questions
then the fundament discretion of the court arises, namely whether to
make an order for reasonable financial provision in the applicant's favour.
This is a pure example of judicial discretion, hut like most such discre-
tions it is governed by and must be exercised in the context of, a number
of stated factors, both general and specific which are set out in section 5.
That section states that the court: in determining whether and in
what manner it shall exercise its powers under [section 41, have regard to
the following matters'. There follows a list of general factors of the sort
which one would expect relating to the financial resources and needs of
the applicant and the other claimants; the size and nature of the estate;
41
sionprovi-
White v Ticehurst (1986) 2 FLR 83. The reason being that the application for financial
is personal to the applicant and is not an action vvinch can survive for the benefit of his or
her estate. Similarly an infant child who was adopted after the death but before the hearing
was held to be not qualified to apply under the English Act; Re Collins 11990] Fam 56.
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helpfulun-any physical
or mental disabilities of the applicant; ending with an
'any other matter' and including, the surely anomalous and
anachronistic, 'conduct of the applicant or any other person'.
The specific factors relevant to each type of application are then set
out.
tioncontribu-
In relation to
spouses, for example, age, duration of, and
to marriage, and the interesting so-called divorce standard, ie what
the applicant might have expected to receive if the marriage had been
terminated by divorce instead of death - a reference which has caused
major confusion and judicial disagreement in England.42 This and some
sideredcon-of
the other factors specific to an application by a spouse will be
in the light of the decision in Re Estate of Lee Sai Wai 4' below.
But helpful though these guidelines are they are no more than that and
provide little precise indication as to the likely outcome of a particular
application.
The fourth layer: what order to make
If the court, having been satisfied on the first two questions and having
decided that it is an appropriate case to exercise its discretion under the
priateappro-
third layer, then has to decide on what manner of provision is
and the nature and type of the appropriate order. The former is
ioverned again by the factors set out in section 5 whilst the latter is
*
subject to the list of possible orders which the court can make set out
in section 4.44 If the court is satisfied on the merits of the application
in the light of the relativities, the judge will then proceed to resolve
* the case by the exercise of the judicial discretion and determine what
provision if any, should be made and as to the nature and type of the
appropriate order.
The range of possible orders that can be made is sufficiently wide
to enable the court to tailor the appropriateness of the order to the
42 See the cases in n 51 below. The special factors relevant the in 5(2 );to spouse are set out s to
parents in s 5(3); to children in s 5(4); to brothers and sisters in s 5(5) and to other applicants
in s 5(6). In all cases the facts and circumstances to be taken into account are those at the date
of the hearing, not at the date of the death; s 5(7).4 Above.
44 In summary: (a) periodical (b) lump (c) transfer of (d) settlementpayments; sum; property; ot
property; and (e) acquisition of property. The court can also make consequential orders;
subsections (5) and (4).
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circumstances
mentsettle-
of the estate and the affected parties, whether by
of property., periodic payments or lump sum orders. Which of these
orders, or combination of orders the court chooses to make, is again a
matter of discretion by the court, not a matter of right by the applicant.
The relativity of claims
The consideration and exercise of the second, third and fourth layers of
the judicial discretion involves making a value judgment on the relative
sidercon-
merits of the competing claims against the estate. The court has to
not only the merits of the applicant's case, but also, in all cases, the
claims of the designated testate or intestate beneficiaries * because any
exercise of the discretion to make an award inevitably involves 'taking
from
ingclaim-
Peter to pay Paul'. Where there is more than one applicant
aga nst the estate the court must in addition balance the relative
merits of each those applicants, as well as the claims of the testate or
intestate beneficiaries.
Thus all family provision cases involve assessment of relativities. It
is perfectly possible for an applicant to have a 'good' case but receive
nothing because others have stronger claims, such as where a child, who
has been left unprovided for in the will, claims against an elderly widow;
gerstron-
in such a case a 'strong' case by the child may well fail against the
case of the widow. Conversely a weak case may succeed where, for
eficiariesben-example, the estate is left to charity or passes to remote 'windfall'under intestacy, when the burden of influencing the court's
discretion will he much easier to discharge.
Another important factor affecting the outcome of an application
will be the size and nature of the estate since a large free estate will be
more able to satisfy diverse claims upon it than a small or fixed estate.
For this reason reports of previous cases decided under the Ordinance
can be at best no more than a guide or indication as to the outcome
of any other case because each case will have a completely different
combination of facts, circumstances, factors, and competing claims.
A successful claim by a widow may result in an award of one halt ot
:
the estate in one case, but of only one quarter in another; an adult child
may succeed in one set of circumstances but have no chance of success
in another.
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An Illustrative Case:
In The Estate Of Lee Sai Wai (decd)
The
tionexamina-
exercise of the judicial discretion can be illustrated by an
of the only substantive case on the Ordinance, In the Estate of Lee
Sai Wai (decd), Leung Kam Yin Joyce v Li Oi Lun45 the case concerned an
application by a widow tor reasonable financial provision out of her
husband's
bandhus-
estate. The parties married in 1990 in Canada, when the
was aged 40 and the applicant was aged 28. There were no children
of the marriage and in fact, after the marriage the couple didn't live
turnedre-together much since the wife remained in
Canada and the husband
to Hong Kong. The husband died in April 2000 and by his will,
made in March 1999, he left his entire estate to his two brothers and his
sister equally. He made no provision for his wife and gave no reason for
not doing so. His estate comprised a flat in Kornhill owned solely by
himself, purchased before the marriage, debt-free and valued at $2.9m
and cash and securities valued at $2.15m. After funeral expenses and
legal costs the estate was, by the time of the trial, worth about $4.385m.
The defendant was the sister of the deceased, one of the beneficiaries
under the will.
A preliminary issue to be resolved was a claim by the defendant that
the house was held by the deceased as constructive trustee for himself
and his brothers and sisters in proportion to their respective contributions.
,benefi-This was accepted by Deputy Judge Saunders, deciding that thecial interest was owned as to two thirds for the deceased and as to one
third for the siblings. Further the judge accepted a similar argument as
to $120,000 of the cash, holding that of this $90,000 belonged to the
siblings. That left the total beneficial value of the estate as $3,415,000.
The first layer of discretion
Applying the analysis above to the case the first layer of decision or
discretion was easily decided. The applicant was the wife of the deceased,
this is a purely definitional category and the applicant had locus standi
as such, to apply under the Ordinance: section 3(1)(i) and section 2.
4s
120011 4 HKC; 120021 4 HKC 517, first instance; alfirmed by the C.'ourr Appeal, CACV,t
301/2002.
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The second layer of discretion
This likewise was easily answered. The estate was worth over $4 million;
modationaccom-
the will left nothing to the wife; the wife was in need, she needed
and income, and the wife was in poor health; accordingly the
will had failed to make reasonable financial provision for the applicant.
The third layer of discretion
This required substantive consideration and resolution. To some extent
this question is the corollary of the second since a finding that the will
failed to make reasonable financial provision suggests that the court
should do so. But not necessarily, since it could be that the beneficiaries
under the will could demonstrate greater need than the applicant could.
However in this case the conclusion in favour of the applicant was, it is
strateddemon-submitted, inevitable, since it was a case of a widow who hadreal need, competing against her husband's brothers and sister,
who had not proved any need on their part.
erninggov-
The following factors were identified by the judge as relevant in
the exercise of his discretion.
The testator's wishes: under the general heading 'any other matter' in
paragraph (g), the (English) court has had regard. as a relevant matter,
to the deceased's testamentary intentions or promises even where these
have not found expression in the will.4 But such wishes or intentions
have not overridden the primary objective approach and47 have not led
the court awarding financial provision for the applicant which went
beyond what was reasonably required for his or her maintenance. In the
instant case there were no reasons expressed in the will but there was
evidence that the testator had been advised as to the possible effect
of the Ordinance. Further that the testator had handed the will to his
sister saying that he had left his whole estate to her and their brothers
'because the estate belonged to the family'. Judge Saunders whilst
accepting that the testator's reasons could be relevant in some cases,
46 See Rees v Newberv and the Institute of Cancer Research [19981 1 FLR 1041; Re Goodchid (deed)
[1997] 2 All ER 63; Espinosa v Bourke 11999] 1 FLR 747 and Robinson v Bird 12003] All ER (D1
190.
47 See Blackbume J in Robinson v Bird, above.
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thought that reasons could have little impact in a case where there had
been a blatant failure to provide for a widow.48
The financial resources and needs of the applicant (section 5( 1 )(a)): it is
clear that the judge found that there had been less than full disclosure
by the wife as to the nature and extent of her assets, but surprisingly, the
judge did 'not hold the concealment against her in assessing the evidence'.
Although it was not entirely clear what the assets and resources of the
sourcesre-
applicant were, the judge was satisfied that she had some capital
and could not be treated as an applicant with nothing at all.
But she was aged 40 and in poor health, there was reference to a limited
comewel-disability resulting in limited earning capacity. She was not madein the family home and was forced to rent her own accommodation.
In the circumstances the judge was satisfied that she had demonstrated
a real need. This indicated that she would need some capital in order to
invest and live on the income or possibly to buy some accommodation
and work part time.
The financial resources and needs of the beneficiaries (section 5( 1 )(c)):
they were all comfortably off and could not establish any real need.
The size and nature of the estate (section 5(l) ( e)): the estate was
substantial, the net value being $3,415,000 of which 43 per cent was in
readily realisable cash or securities.
The wife's disability (section 5( 1)(f)): the wife would remain under
some limited disability which would make it difficult for her to find work.
The beneficiaries were in good health.
Age and duration of the marriage (section 5( 1)(a)): the wife was aged
40 and had no children to whom she could look to for support in her old
age. The marriage had lasted for nine years.
The wife's contribution to the welfare of the family (section 5(2)(b)): not
a significant factor.
The divorce standard (section 5(2)): on the basis of a clean beak the
wife could have expected to have received 40 per cent of the available
sum on divorce.4
4 Citing Re Inns, Inns v Wallace 119471 Ch 576 and Re Krubert (decd) 119971Ch 97.
4'; Re Besterman (deed) 119841 I Ch 458; White White 120001 3 WLR 1571 and Cowan C,uan. v
12001] 1 All ER (D) 173, cited, but Judge Saunders was carefill to reserve the quetion whether
these cases represented the law in Hong Kong * see the comment inm the Court ot Appeal,
ibid., para 13. As indicated earlier there were no guiding Hong Kong authorities.
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The closeness of the marital relationship (section 5(6) ): Judge Saunders
was satisfied that the
relationship was sufficiently close not to detract
from the amount of the award.
The judge did not indicate what particular weight he placed on each
of these factors nor whether one was more persuasive than the others.
But having considered them all, and balanced the respective claims
of the applicant and the beneficiaries in the light of them, the judge
cantappli-decided that the balance of his discretion fell onto the side of thend that he should exercise his discretion by making an order for
reasonable financial provision out of the estate for the applicant.
The fourth laNer ofdiscretion
And so the judge came to the crucial question 'how much'? In making
the award the judge had regard to all the factors noted above. He found
that the wife had demonstrated 'a real need' and was mindful that when
making provision for a widow the court is not restricted to maintenance.
Some guidance can he obtained on the sort of award that might be
appropriate for a widow from previous cases on the corresponding
English legislation * although Judge Saunders did not refer to such cases
in his judgment.
Re Besterman (decd):50 a decision of the English Court of Appeal.
The widow was competing only against charities for a very large estate
of GBP 1.5 million. The widow was awarded a total of GBP 378,000
being approximately one quarter of the available assets, hut note that in
view of the size of the estate this was sufficient to provide the widow
with a sum which rendered her free of any financial worries in the future.
Re Bunning (decd):51 a first instance English authority. The widow was
competing against charities tor a medium sized estate of GBP 237,000
(net GBP 206,000) hut the widow had been given GBP 100,000 inter *
vivos. The widow was awarded a total of GBP 60,000 which (added to
the GBP 100,000 she already had) was approximately one half of the
total joint assets.
50 [198412 All ER 656.
51 119841 3 All ER 1.
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Mood's.' v Stevenson:: a decision of the English Court of Appeal. The
ousprevi-widower was competing against his deceased's wife's daughter by amarriage, who was the sole beneficiary under the will of a small
estate ofGBP 40,000 consisting mostly of the matrimonial home. Order
made was a settlement of the matrimonial home on term giving the
widower the right to occupy the matrimonial home for as long as he was
willing and able to do so.
petingcom-Re Krubert (decd): English Court of Appeal. The widow wasagainst the deceased's brother and sister for a medium sized estate
of GBP110,000, plus a house (of unspecified value) in which the widow
had only been given a life interest. The widow was awarded the whole of
the assets except for the house in which she took a life interest.
+4
So on the example of those cases (although recognising that these
were cases on the English and not the Hong Kong legislation) what
should the provision be in the case under discussion?
Judge Saunders thought that this was not a case, in the light of the
fact that the widow and the siblings could not live amicably together in
fertrans-
the home, where it would be appropriate to make an order for the
of the home to the applicant. Rather the needs of the applicant
could best be satisfied by a lump sum award, which would recognise the
standard of provision appropriate for a widow. In determining the amount
of the award the judge re-considered the divorce standard, which might
0usobvi-suggest an award of40 per cent of the estate, but bore in mind the. fact that provision of divorce is not analogous to provision on death
for the simple that in the former the needs of both parties the
'
reason to
*
marriage have to be considered whereas in the latter only one.
+
119921 2 All ER 524
q
119971Ch 97.
q Note that in Moody v Stetenson the court was influenced by the divorce standard, ie what the
spouse would have been awarded on divorce, whereas this factor was neutral inm I3unnm and
minimised in Besterman. In Krubert the court expressly stated that the t3estennan approach was
to be preferred and undue regard should n,,t be paid to the divorce standard because on a
divitrce two parties had to be provided for; on death there was ,mlv one'. The award in I{c
Krubert can be regarded as being in excess of what would have been awarded on divorce.; q
In other this might well have been order of the thatcircumstances :in ;ippropriate in view tact
the widow had no home of her own and was living in rented ;wcommodarion.
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Applying that consideration the judge made an order for a lump sum
award of $1,750,000, which was half of the estate. Few would object to
visionpro-
that award since it is in line with the sort of awards appropriate to
for a widow. The Judge awarded the costs of the action to the
mententitle-applicant, which thus fell on the estate, reducing further the netof the testamentary beneficiaries.
The Court of Appeal Decision
The defendant appealed Judge Saunders' decision both on the trust point
and the award made. The finding on the trust point depended largely on
tionableobjec-the evidence of contribution and the Court could find nothingin the way that the first instance judge had decided it.
An appeal against a judicial exercise of a discretion is always difficult
because appeal courts are notoriously reluctant to interfere with a trial
judge's discretion. Only if the appellant could show that the judge had
nanceOrdi-erred in principle or had plainly disregarded a factor which thestated should he taken into account or had conversely taken a
factor into account which he was not justified to do, would the Court
of Appeal likely interfere with the decision. In considering the judge's
exercise for his discretion it was argued that he had paid insufficient
weight to one factor rather than another. The Vice-President Rogers
disagreed, finding no error in principle or with reference to the evidence
or the factors which had or had not been taken into account and
concluded: In those circumstances I do not consider that it is open to
this court to interfere with the exercise of discretion by the trial judge
which he is given under the Ordinance.
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